

IV. *Favorable and Unfavorable Factors:*

A. *Nasser:*

1. *Favorable*

a. Has a great deal to gain since Israel has both a head-start and a far greater capacity in the nuclear field and will soon overtake the UAR in missile development, whereas the UAR's ultimate advantages lie in conventional fields;

b. Is not asked to give up existing weapons;

c. Will seek to obtain U.S. estimates of Israeli capabilities and monitoring of French involvements since he now lacks capabilities in these areas.

d. Will wish to be responsive to the U.S. since he will perceive advantages in encouraging the flow of U.S. aid and avoiding undue military and economic dependence on the Communist bloc;

e. Will foresee some future tactical advantage in building his stature in the Afro-Asian bloc as a world statesman opposed to nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation; and

f. Is under considerable and growing strain to allocate his small economic resources to development in order to cope with his rapidly increasing population and to meet its rising expectations.

2. *Unfavorable*

a. Will fear that if he is placed in the position of appearing to make peace with Israel, it will be ruinous to his position in the Arab world.

b. Will suspect that the approach has been prompted by domestic U.S. political pressures aroused by the recent furor over German scientists in the UAR and that we are merely preparing the ground to give Israel a security guarantee.

c. Will fear that the arrangement might (i) weaken his position of leadership in the Arab and African world which require the UAR to be the strongest military power of the area, (ii) starve the military appetite for the latest and best in military equipment, (iii) weaken UAR military deterrence capabilities both with the East and West, and (iv) rob the UAR of its ability to develop its own weapons program.

d. Will fear appearing to be the tool of the U.S.

e. Will suspect that covert arrangements between the French and Israelis will continue in the nuclear and missile field despite any agreement.

f. Will lack confidence in the constancy of U.S. policy and remain suspicious that US-UAR relations remain very tenuous (e.g., attacks in Congress and the press, delays in fulfilling economic commitments, military measures to support Jordan and Saudi Arabia).

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]